Jerusalem Quarterly File

Issue 10, 2000

The Rise and Fall of the 
Husaynis, 1840-1922
(Part 1)

Illan Peppe

Contents

Section 1

Preface 

The local notables in the Arab provinces, the A'ayan, became the social leadership in their localities due to the double-edged legitimacy granted to them both by their society, which respected the notables' religious standing, and by the central authority in Istanbul, which vested the notables with important positions within the provinces. This impressive position required navigating and balancing skills which became the essence of what the late Albert Hourani called 'the politics of notables'. These tactics were the ethical and political code of the urban society in the Arab world during the Ottoman period and remained so during the transitional era, leading to the emergence of local national- ism and eventually to independence. 

This article examines this modus operandi in Jerusalem's leading family, the house of the Husaynis. It argues that this code saw the Husaynis through dramatic upheavals including the two major evolutions in Palestine's fortune: the end of Ottomanism in 1908 and the termination of Islamic rule altogether in 1918.It was not however sufficient in the face of Zionism. It was a code that enabled adaptation to every new regime, provided it was not intent on depopulating the country o cleansing it for its own purposes. Against such an ethnic or national ideology, the notables did not carry the authority nor the abilities to save themselves and their own society, as became painfully clear in 1948. 

The essence of the 'Politics of Notables' was a careful mediation between the society that the Aa'yan represented, and the authority that appointed them. The notables' peculiar position enabled the central government in Istanbul to administer the provinces from afar and at the same time this position provided a buffer for the local society, albeit not always a resilient one, against the whims and caprices of the regional or central rulers. The key to the notables' success was moderation which, when it worked, enabled this elite to remain in a paramount position through- out the political dramas of the 18th and 19th centuries, a time when the area be- came an arena for colonial competition and a stage for insurgent local rulers. 

The leading families of Jerusalem in the 18th and 19th centuries practiced to a certain extent this set of political rules; or at least a local version of it. We are particularly interested in their behavior as a social unit towards the end of the Ottoman era. The developments within this phase posed the greatest challenge to the old Ottoman political code and to the rules underlining the 'Politics of Notables'. 

In the case of Jerusalem, however, this article will argue that the code remained intact and effective until the outbreak of the First World War. The 'Politics of Notables' was a successful means in the hands of the Husaynis for preserving their status and position in the city of Jerusalem and even in the independent Sanjaq of Jerusalem which was established in 1872.The Husaynis sustained their position in the city and even strengthened it by employing the traditional rules of the game. These rules were even helpful in digesting the newest of all human ideological inventions nationalism. The same dexterity that characterized the Husaynis' navigation skills in between the society and the external authorities could be seen at work once again in the twentieth century, as late as the first decade of British rule in Palestine. They proved, however, useless in the face of Zionism and pro-Zionist British policy. 

Historical Background 

The Husayni family in around 1860 was divided into two branches. One was descended, but not directly, from Hasan al- Husayni, a reputed scholar of the eighteenth century. Hasan's position was transferred to his nephew Tahir al-Husayni. Hence, the branch which held successfully the position of the Hanafi Mufti stretching until Haj Amin al-Husayni, is referred to as either the Hasani branch or the Tahiri one. The family's adherence to the Hanafi Madhab was a fortunate coincidence since it became in 1785 the favorite Madhab of the sultans in Istanbul. 

The second was those in the family who had held in succession the Nikaaba ,the title of Naqib al-Ashraf .This post declined in importance by the mid-nineteenth century and was replaced by the mayorship of the city. This branch is referred to as the Omari branch, after another eighteenth century Husayni who was one of the first in the family to hold the title. 

By the mid-nineteenth century, the family began establishing itself as a leading force. In that phase old challenges met new ones. The family's agenda consisted of internal struggles with other rival families for keeping the three posts of Naqib al-Ashraf, the Mufti and Sheikh al-Haram in its hands. Simultaneously, the family had to cope with the aggressiveness and greediness of local Ottoman governors of the city and particularly with the regional governors in Damascus, Beirut and Acre who all strove to control Palestine in the name of the Empire on the one hand, or in the case of the Egyptians, in the name of a new political entity. These political developments intertwined with the mundane business of running the religious institutions of the city for those who were in the Niqaba branch or enjoying the richness of theological and literary debates and discussions for those holding the chain of Ifta . 

At that time, one additional concern required the family's wits and tactfulness in order to be able to stride safely into the Tanzimat period (1840-1876),after surviving Egyptian rule (1831-1840).During the Egyptian period, the family was a leading factor in the rebellion against Muhamad Ali, but was able to mend fences with the Egyptians and nonetheless retain a solid relationship with the returning Ottomans. After the Ottoman rule was reestablished in Palestine in 1840,the family was embroiled in an ancient rivalry in the vicinity of Jerusalem between the clans of Qais and those of the Yaman allegiances. This division between local clans went back to the rivalries between the Northern (Qais) and Southern (Yaman) tribes in the formative years of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula and their resettlement in the Fertile Crescent later on. On the basis of this coalition, the Husaynis, with Yamani affiliations, kept allegiance to the rural lord of the Jerusalem mountains, Mustafa Abu-Ghosh who was in constant friction with Qaisi coalitions for control over land and villages. There is a debate among the scholars of the period on the duration of these feuds. There are those who claim that this sphere of loyalty still existed in 1920,while others see them as of secondary important ever since the second half of the 19th century. Miram Hexoter sensibly remarks that overall this rivalry was a rural phenomenon and since Jerusalem was more urban in nature it mattered less in this city's affairs.[1] 

None the less conflicts remained in the 1840s and did affect the city's life. The Khalidis led the Qais faction and the Husaynis the Yamani one within the city's parameters. However, the competition between the families was for contemporary positions and not in the name of that or other coalition. The Yamani allegiance was used by the Husaynis as a meditating facility between feuding rural lords or for widening its influence beyond the city's walls. This patronage connection, for instance, strengthened the Husaynis' influence in the Beit Lehem area, as the town was mainly Yamanite. 

The role of mediation was a dominant feature in the politics of notables towards the end of the 1850s.In the spring of 1855, there was widespread unrest in Jabal Nablus. The Jarars and the Tuqans collided with the Abd al-Hadis. This was a feud aggravated by the policies of Ibrahim Pasha during his short reign in Palestine where he exercised to perfection the old style divide et impera .The central government failed constantly to appoint a neutral ruler, each coalition wishing to install its own candidate. The Pasha of Jerusalem and the notables intervened and convinced both sides to accept a compromise candidate, Sheik Darwish of Nabi Daud. The Tuqans were connected to the Husaynis in marriage and thus the Husaynis could induce them to consent to the compromise and were on cordial relations with the rivals and for a while pacified the otherwise turbulent area of Nablus.[2] 

But this seemed to be the last meaningful involvement of the family in such feuds. By the end of the Crimean War, these local conflicts were marginalized in the family's agenda giving way to m